Abstract
Introduction
Rapid technological and regulatory changes are altering foreign exchange (FX) markets profoundly, although special features of these markets are likely to survive.
Participant profile and behavior is also changing, as technology makes it easier for small parties to access markets anytime and anywhere. The paper reviews these changes, internationally and then domestically. Reforms in Indian markets offer a good case study of the tensions between regulators, markets and technology. The paper also draws out the implications for effective central bank (CB) interventions and for exchange rate policy.
The current consensus from many empirical studies is while macro fundamentals determine the exchange rate at long horizons, there are substantial and persistent deviations largely unexplained by these fundamentals.
A literature on market microstructure of FX markets grew rapidly after seminal work by Lyons (2001) . This suggests the mechanics of FX trading has important short-run effects on exchange rates. This is a departure from the traditional modeling strategy of treating foreign exchange rates as a macroeconomic relative price. It also implies it is not only public information which is relevant.
Survey data shows there is considerable heterogeneity in agents' expectations of the future exchange rate. Therefore private information, the transmission of this information, and the relation between information flows plays a vital role. Proprietary information is contained in order flows, which is the net of buyer-initiated and sellerinitiated orders. Although this is a variant of net demand, it is not necessarily equal to zero in equilibrium. Each bank will have knowledge only of its own order flow, which is used to update subjective estimates of the underlying value of the currency.
Order flow is a more precise proxy for expected future fundamentals, since it presents a willingness to back one's beliefs with real money. In specifications that include macro fundamentals and order flow variables, Evans and Lyons (1999) find order flow to be a significant determinant of the exchange rate. It performs better than both standard macroeconomic variables, and random walk forecasts.
It follows foreign exchange markets are influenced by a combination of macroeconomic and microeconomic variables. The market microstructure within which they operate, macroeconomic fundamentals, and policies affect the decisions micro market agents make. The Central Bank (CB) is a special kind of agent with special powers and information. So its actions, including intervention and signaling, also have major effects. The Indian experience confirms this.
Other participants in FX markets include banks, non-bank financial companies (NBFCs), merchants and merchant-brokers. Large banks play the role of market makers, accepting both buy and sell quotes. Merchant transactions were originally restricted to trade and other retail transactions involving foreign currency, but now generate many kinds of transactions due to risk management activities. Large and sophisticated corporate treasuries now have multiple FX operations.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses some institutional features of foreign exchange markets, with a special sub-section and boxes on the process of liberalization and deepening in Indian FX markets. Section 3 draws out implications of varying trader information for exchange rate policy. Section 4 concludes. An Appendix gives some derivations for the model used in Section 3.
Foreign Exchange Market: Institutional features
Compared to other financial markets, FX markets have unique features 1 . We briefly describe their structure, composition, effects of change in technology and in regulations, then draw out implications for their functioning.
Structure: They are the most liquid markets. Daily market turnover was $ 5.4 trillion in 2013 (BIS 2013) . But only about 5 percent of the very large turnover is actually due to customer trade. Decentralized large volume markets with many physically separated market makers, interact through the telephone or private networks, not in a centralized market like a stock market. Decentralization makes FX markets fragmented and less transparent. There is no publicly announced price, and no law requiring disclosure of trades. Each broker or market maker only knows own order flows, with no incentive to share the information. Brokers normally accumulate a subset of market makers' limit orders, and quote the best buy and sell order from a 'book'
they keep of such limit orders. A limit order is an offer to either buy or sell a certain quantity of a currency at a certain bilateral exchange rate.
In a stock market clearing-house each party trades with it -doubling the number of transactions. This is known as 'novation'. The identity of the counter-party does not matter since the clearing-house warranties the trade covering its risk through margin payments and deposits. But in an FX market there are many market makers. Market spreads can vary to cover the cost of market-making including counter-party risk 2 .
Even if the net position is close to zero, credit limits get filled up, unlike in a clearing house, where only the net position is required for settlement.
Banks that are reporting dealers have to be the market makers in a decentralized market since brokers cannot assess credit worthiness. Identity may be known only after the deal. The direct FX market is double auction and open-bid. That is, two-way prices on both bid and ask are announced to all agents in the market. The brokered market is single auction and limit order. That is, prices are specified only to buy or sell but not both. They are known only to the broker and the party making the offer. (Geithner, 2004) .
But regulation has to continue to evolve in response to new types of malpractices.
Since banks often act as principal to a trade, they buy at the moment the client sells. (54) 176 (220) 182 (462) 3 (3) 38 (24) 31 (53 110.9 134.5 246.5
Note: Items (1) to (7) were calculated from RBI bulletins. The data was collected for all the months in the given years and summed up. Each year is taken from April to March. (8) to (15) (9) to (13) and (15) are as percentage to (8), (14) is a percentage of spot in net-gross terms; FCY: Foreign currency; INR: Indian rupees; RDs: Reporting dealers a All transactions involve exposure to more than one currency. b Excluding "tomorrow/next day" transactions c A swap is considered to be a single transaction in that the two legs are not counted separately. Including "tomorrow/next day" transactions
The percentage of intervention to interbank turnover fell from 13.4 in 2001-02 to 0.9 in 2006-07, but it was still large compared to mature economies. The Bank of Japan intervened successfully in 2011 even with a percentage of 0.2. This is the annual intervention percentage. The CB share can be much higher for daily intervention, which tends to be concentrated on a few days. Since the inter-bank market remains a large size of the total, the inter-bank share is not much higher than the percentage of CB intervention to total turnover. CB intervention, however, affected only domestic markets.
-----Even so, the derivative segment of the FX market also evolved. Cross-currency derivatives with the rupee as one leg were introduced, with some restrictions, in April The Reserve Bank moved gradually to eliminate restrictions on FX markets.
Historically, the availability of hedging tools against foreign exchange risk was limited to entities with direct underlying foreign exchange exposures. However, with a larger set of economic agents exposed to foreign exchange risk there was a shift to the concept of "economic exposure", that is, the effect of exchange rates on a firm's value. There were gradual steps to give greater flexibility to corporates for managing their exposures. For example, it was proposed to permit agents to book forward contracts without production of underlying documents up to an annual limit of US $ 100,000, which could be freely cancelled and rebooked. Cancellation and rebooking of forward contracts and swaps in India were regulated to reduce rupee volatility.
There were moves to allow banks to fix their own net open position limits (NOPL) and AGL limits based on their risk appetite and ability to manage exposure, with adequate prudential regulation and supervision to cover systemic risk and prevent excessive leverage. By 2011, while banks boards set the NOPLs they had to be approved by the RBI.
---
Box 2: The Process of Regulatory Change in India
FX market regulations followed a dynamic process driven by regulatory objectives of market development with stability, demands from and requirements of markets. Some examples of this dialectic are given below, over 2002-13, a period with major changes in Indian FX markets.
Since 2002 persons resident in India were allowed to enter into forward contracts on the basis of underlying exposures. Further, exporters and importers were allowed to book forward contracts on the basis of declaration of exposures and based on past performances, subject to specified conditions. Permissions were slowly expanded, with the aim of enabling hedging through the reversal of a real transaction.
The annual Policy Statement for the Year 2007-08 (paras 142) provided greater flexibility to the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector and resident individuals, further liberalization of the scope and range of forward contracts, to facilitate such entities to hedge their foreign currency exposures on a dynamic basis.
There was a warning that authorized dealer (AD) Category -I bank should carry out due diligence regarding "user appropriateness" and "suitability" of the forward contracts to the SME customers.
NRIs could now book forward contracts without production of underlying documents up to a limit of USD 100,000, based on self-declaration. These contracts would normally be on a deliverable basis. However, in case of mismatches in cash flows or other exigencies, the contracts booked under this facility could be cancelled and rebooked. The notional value of the outstanding contracts was not to exceed USD 100,000 at any time. Further, the contracts were permitted for tenors of up to one year only.
Source 1. Importers and exporters with foreign currency exposures in trade transactions, permitted to write covered call and put options both in foreign currency-rupee and cross currency and also to receive premia.
2. AD Category I banks permitted to offer plain vanilla cross currency options to persons residents in India (other than AD Category-I banks), who transform their rupee liability into a foreign currency liability.
3. Given the facilities given in item 1 the facility of zero cost structures/cost reduction structures was to be withdrawn, since these opaque structures were used for speculation on rupee strengthening and imposed large losses on firms in 2008.
17 January 2012: Hedging commodity risk on international exchanges allowed for listed companies through banks.
Reducing detailed oversight reduces transaction costs for firms, but the regulator has to prevent systemic risk. Although the strategy was to move from micro controls to regulating broad patterns, there was some back-tracking in times of high volatility. Over 2011-13 there was some reversal in permissions due to global risk-off and excess rupee volatility and FX markets shrank somewhat.
----
Types of intervention in FX markets
Although the stated position remained the RBI would act to prevent excess volatility, markets were allowed to determine INR level and volatility subject to what remained of capital controls that were being reduced under domestic and international pressure.
Intervention was temporarily suspended in 2007 at a time of strong inflows that made sterilization difficult, but resumed to accumulate inflows from October as the market stabilization bonds were negotiated for cost sharing with the government. The INR had to depreciate during post-Lehman equity outflows in order for them to take a write-down in asset values and share risk. The RBI did sell some reserves. Inflows resumed quickly, however, and upto end 2011, were just adequate to finance the CAD. So there was hardly any intervention in this period. This led to the market misperception that the RBI was unable to intervene in FX markets, aided by statements from the RBI about the large size of India's FX liabilities and potential capital movements relative to reserves. RBI communication was large-scale intervention was not possible since reserves even at 300 billion now just covered India's international liabilities. Just as policy allowed more market determination of the exchange rate becoming increasingly hands off, strong global risk-on risk-off in the period after the GFC created perverse movements in the exchange rate.
As inflows slowed due to global risk aversion after the Euro-debt crisis, markets shorted the rupee and it began to fall steeply, almost reaching 55. Goyal (2015) Raising interest rates to defend the rupee in July 2013 was a total failure. The rupee depreciated from around 60 in July to a low of 68 in August. The 3% rise in short- Each party is assumed to make inferences based on the other's behavior, under shocks that affect information extraction. The speculative demand curve is downward sloping in the spot rate and stable if there is greater uncertainty about fundamentals, or if speculators prior on the target and CB's weight on the target are small. The first normally holds in an EM, and the second and third hold if the target is diffuse. The estimated speculative demand using data over 2002-08 was found to be downward sloping. CB purchase of dollars tended to depreciate the domestic currency, and reduced its volatility. Expectations were stabilizing and not perverse.
The results suggest a CB in an EM can optimally reveal some information, but should not announce an explicit target, or reveal its trading tactics. There is a range of possible signals. Greater uncertainty about fundamentals makes it more worthwhile for the CB to reveal some information about an exchange rate target.
As the model implies, market microstructure variables were found to affect intervention efficacy. Market microstructure variables such as merchant and dealer net demand (order flow) and turnover variables affected the level and volatility of exchange rates. Merchant turnover was a driving force, volatility and expected volatility increased dealer turnover. It follows microstructure variables matter and policy has a role in limiting volatility.
Anticipated intervention decreased turnover, so expectations from intervention were stabilizing and not perverse. They dampened rupee volatility. Since markets form expectations of intervention activity and respond strategically to it, more transparency may reduce the scope for such arbitrage. Although more transparency could reduce speculative positions, a diffuse target may work better. Estimated strategic market behavior and model derivations both indicated intervention and signaling to be an effective influence on exchange rates in the Indian context.
The interest rate differential had weak effects on the exchange rate but strong effects on market turnover. With the extant level of controls, the effect of the interest rate on the domestic cycle was stronger than its effect on the exchange rate. Given the evidence of the impact of policy on markets, more transparent intervention may effectively influence exchange rates in the Indian context, leaving interest rates free to target the domestic cycle. Next we turn to examining the efficacy of market restrictions in more detail.
Impact of measures on domestic markets
The repeated scams and financial mishaps of the nineties demonstrated the fragility of a controlled system. Therefore financial reforms towards steady market deepening were undertaken. But the global financial crisis demonstrated the wisdom of India's slow and steady approach to market liberalization, and the necessity of prudential regulation to reduce risk-taking. Action on the INR was not, however, always consistent with these lessons. Sometimes actions were too hasty and cautious steps forward to deepen domestic markets were reversed, but did not always succeed in reducing rupee volatility.
On They also cancelled rebooking of forwards (corporates were shifting hedging band to 55-60, paying the option fee of 2 percent). These measures to reduce speculation by exporters and banks appreciated INR/USD from 54.2 to 52.7 (Table 1) (Behera, 2011) . Although such markets create problems for policy, they normally wither away as domestic markets deepen (Ho and McCauley, 2004) .
Although they are difficult to measure precisely BIS (2010 Table E6 , 2013 Table 6 
Encouraging hedging
A conviction of possible two-way movement of the exchange rate, large enough to deliver a substantial loss to one-way bets is a pre-requisite for hedging or the laying off of currency exposure. Despite deepening FX markets, the moderate two-way movement within an implicit 5% band seen over 2004-06 was not sufficient to overcome strong expectations of medium term appreciation given India's high growth 12 Mecklai (2011) argues it had become higher even by 2011. 13 It is noteworthy that the relative size of forwards in net-net global GBP trade and net-gross trade in UK is reversed for the deepest FX market, UK. In April 2013, the net-gross at USD 309bn was much larger than net-net at USD 69 bn. Thus availability of more instruments, alone, only makes leveraged speculation, or bets on future currency value, possible. Establishing inducement to hedge through sufficient flexibility of the exchange rate, along with transparency, clarity and information, and strategic use of controls, are more important (Shiller, 1993 , Shefrin, 2002 . Completing markets will not by itself reduce speculation. Incentives have to be changed, and better information provided on fundamentals.
FX Markets and Policy
Well-designed signals can help use the structure of FX markets with varying trader information levels to achieve policy objectives such as reducing exchange rate
volatility. An EM is likely to have a larger share of poorly informed traders. Jeanne and Rose (2002) have a model with informed and noise traders (n) in an FX market. The benefit of entry for noise traders rises with excess returns or risk, ρ, but falls with the variance of the spot rate, var (S). But both ρ and var (S) are functions of n. A rise in n lowers ρ since a larger number of traders are demanding the currency thus spreading risk; but raises var (S) since entry raises volatility and therefore risk.
Both reduce entry. But the rise in var (S) itself raises ρ, thus increasing entry. Noise traders therefore have two counteracting roles. They both create risk and share risk, making multiple equilibria possible.
This can be shown in a simple diagrammatic device following Goyal (2006) . G(n), the function giving the returns to noise trader entry is graphed against n in Figure 4 .3. The two opposing effects of n on G(n) give the curve the shape shown in the Figure   ( derived in the appendix). At low n G is high since var (S) is low. It falls as more n share risk reducing ρ. But further entry creates risk raising var (S) and ρ. At high n G rises again, as the rise in ρ dominates that in var (S).
The lowest dashed curve is the case where fundamentals are strong. Therefore excess returns are so low that it is not worthwhile for any noise trader to enter. Point O is a stable equilibrium, as is C', on the upper dashed curve. On this curve, fundamentals are so weak that all the noise traders enter. Multiple equilibria occur for intermediate fundamentals when G(n) is such that it cuts the 45 line. These are equilibria since G = n at these points. A is stable since for a small departure from A, net returns are such as to bring entry back to n*. C is also stable. But B is unstable. Here the curve cuts the At C' and C all noise traders enter. At A, var(S),  and therefore entry n are all low; at C var(S) and  are both high and maximum entry n takes place. Between AB, since G(n) < n, entry falls back to n* at A; between CB, since G(n) > n, entry rises and n increases to n at C. Therefore O, A, C and C are stable equilibria, while B is unstable. It follows exchange rate volatility can be low if fundamental variance is low, but it can be either high or low for intermediate levels of fundamentals.
Monetary policy can improve welfare if it leads to the selection of low volatility equilibria. It can do this by committing to var(S)  v. Then fewer n enter, this decreases var(S) leading to the selection of the low entry equilibrium A. This is a policy free lunch since markets help monetary policy achieve the reduced volatility it had committed to.
A stable exchange rate regime, where policy constrains var(S) to be less than or equal to v, leads to lower entry of noise traders taking the economy to an equilibrium with low exchange rate variance 16 . Although there is a loss of monetary autonomy in adopting the restriction on var(S), the loss is of second order, as the level of noise in the economy is decreased. Monetary policy response function is constrained out of equilibrium, but there is no sacrifice of monetary autonomy in equilibrium. In the post GFC period Indian exchange rate volatility was allowed to rise too much, while there were also periods when it was too low. Goyal and Arora (2012) give evidence CB speeches affect the exchange rate but over the period signals were poorly used. Table   4 .1 shows this in 2011 but indicates improvement in 2013.
Conclusion
15 The style of proof is similar to the well-known Keynesian cross where the aggregate demand line cuts the 45 aggregate supply line from above in a stable equilibrium. The intuition is similar in the fixed point theorems used in general equilibrium theory. The proof following Goyal (2006) , a major simplification of that used in Jeanne and Rose (2002) , is given in the Appendix. 16 Such an induced entry of noise traders was illustrated by the large-scale shorting of the INR in December 2011 after the CB's communications were taken to imply it would not intervene to support the rupee.
The paper gives an overview of international and Indian FX markets and discusses market microstructure concepts such as 'order flow', bid-ask spreads, limit order, It also draws out the implications of structure for CB intervention, signaling, and exchange rate policy especially in an EM. Committing to a low exchange rate volatility regime provides something like a free lunch to monetary policy, because, as the analysis in the last section showed, entry of noise traders is reduced leading to lower volatility. In an EM there tends to be greater uncertainty about fundamentals.
This tends to make the speculative demand curve well behaved under strategic interaction between differentially informed speculators and the Central Bank (CB). A diffuse exchange rate target and strategic revelation of selected information can be expected, therefore, to be effective. Indian experience supports these results.
Post GFC experience even delivers an effectiveness ranking of policy actions influencing the exchange rate at the current state of capital account convertibility. The most effective is to address fundamental weaknesses that can trigger adverse expectations, but second, reserves and signaling can be used to smooth market demand and supply keeping the exchange rate within bounds. The efficacy of building-up reserves, using them in targeted intervention, and of credible communication to markets was clearly demonstrated. Since capital flows do not always match the net import gap, a CB should be ready to close any short-term demand supply mismatch. Reserves can be built up again during periods of excessive inflows.
Prudential measures such as reducing open positions worked better than a ban on a market or a transaction-type. But it reverses attempts to deepen markets and leads to a migration of activity abroad. If market restrictions become necessary, therefore, they should be carefully targeted. Even if credit curbs are used they should apply only to specific commodities such as gold imports. Since these administrative measures reduce one-way positions, a general liquidity squeeze such as an interest rate defense that hits other markets, should be avoided. EMs should continue the push for greater global policy coordination and measures that reduce the financial over-leverage that leads to capital flow volatility, even while developing regional safety nets.
dominates. But at high n, the positive effect of n on var(S) and therefore on  will dominate- will rise as risk rises. Hence G(n) will also rise with n at high n. Therefore equilibria are possible both at low and at high n. Either a few or a large number of noise traders will enter the FX market. But, in each equilibrium n takes a fixed value, given by the function G(n). Noise traders create risk so var(S) rises and  falls with their entry (n). But  also rises with var(S), since they also share the risk they themselves create.
